Introduction

Vagueness in questions
Following Merin's (1999) approach to relevance, van Rooy (1999) uses Decision Theory (DT) to give a formal definition of relevance in its application to questions. In his analysis, questions are inherently underspecified or vague (1): their denotation contains a variable Op (1b) that depends on a decision problem facing the speaker (i.e., the questioner). In the context of the decision problem, vagueness is resolved: a partition is chosen as the true import of the question (1d). Goal 2: Questioner has to mail hearer a package ! partition ii
The DT approach derives two main types of vagueness: level of granularity as in (1), and degree of exhaustivity (2), where the desired answer could be strongly exhaustive (mention-all) or mention-some.
(2)
Where can I buy an Italian newspaper?
Vagueness in plurals
Striking parallels exist between the types of vagueness inherent in questions and those in definite plurals. First, as repeatedly noted in the literature, definite plurals are vague with respect to the level of granularity (distributivity) (3). Second, definites are vague with respect to exhaustivity: (4) is compatible with the maximal (all the windows) or non-maximal construal of the definite, e.g. excepting a few closed windows if the hearer is wondering if his home is stormproof (Krifka 1996) . In resolving the vagueness, what factors affect the final interpretation for sentences with definite plurals? First, the nature of the VP plays a role. Many predicates require a certain level of distributivity or collectivity in the subject NP (5a,b) (Dowty 1987) , while others seem to produce a preference for maximal (5c) or non-maximal (5d) interpretation (Yoon 1996) . While the VP clearly plays a role, it doesn't fully determine the final interpretation -extra-linguistic factors play a role in resolving the vagueness in both distributivity and maximality. Schwarzschild 1991 notes the influence of the extra-linguistic situation on distributivity with (6a, from Schwarzschild 1991); Krifka (1996) shows the effect of context over-riding Yoon's observation on VP influence with (6bc, from Krifka 1996) . (6) a. Situation: Vegetables arrive at a grocery pre-packaged in baskets. The grocery has a big rough scale suitable for small truckloads, and a small scale for weighing only a few veggies or fruits at a time. To refine these observations, note that every scenario in (6) describes, first, an actual salient arrangement of the entities within the NP into 'packages' (veggies pre-packaged in baskets, windows on the outside of the house, doors in a sequence), and also the goals of conversational participants, as spelled out in (7). (7) a. Utterance: The veggies are too light for the big scale.
(excludes collective interpretation) Packaging: Vegetables arrive at a grocery pre-packaged in baskets. The house has a dozen windows in its outside. Goal 1: To prepare the house for the arrival of window-frame painters ! All windows Goal 2: To ensure the house is rain-proof before a thunderstorm ! Some windows
The empirical data thus indicates the conditions for a theory of interpretation of definite plurals. First, such a theory needs a vague or underspecified semantics that allows for the full range of the collective/distributive and maximal/non-maximal variation. Second, we need a way to encode the effects of the VP, the packaging of entities within the NP denotation, and the speaker/hearer goals in computing the truth-conditions. The idea that both packaging and speaker/hearer goals play a role in determining interpretation of definite plurals is fairly uncontroversial. Existing accounts, however, have either not spelled out the role of extra-linguistic factors, or focused on the role of packaging.
In the next section, I will sketch three promising approaches to distributivity and maximality in definite plurals, and point to the need for an upgraded account.
Existing approaches
Landman 1989
Building on the work of Link (1983) , Landman (1989) offers a semantic theory that permits varying levels of distributivity and (non)maximality. He uses the star (*) operator to pluralize VPs, creating distributive interpretations, and permits predicates to distribute over sums of individuals (a"b"c), but not over groups (!(a"b"c) or the team of a, b, and c). All non-maximal interpretations are instances of collective predication (where the plural is interpreted as a group).
Thus, the interpretations for the sentences in (5ab,6bc) would arise from representations in (8), in a situation where Andy, Bill, Chris, and Dan are the boys, and d1,…d5 are the doors (or windows) (following the arrow I include a simplified formula that indicates more precisely a situation in which the interpretation is true). Note that the only way to require a fully maximal interpretation is to make it fully distributive (8d). 
It is not clear whether Landman's original 1989 theory allows for the intermediate-distributive interpretations like (6a), repeated below.
However, his 1996 paper explicitly derives them via adaptation of Schwarzschild's 1991 proposal described below in section 2.3 and exemplified in (8e), where artichoke, Brussels sprout, cauliflower, daikon, and endive are the vegetables. The definition of 'cover-agent' c Ag(e) is given in section 2.3. 
Landman's theory posits a pervasive ambiguity between singular and plural VPs, and does not distinguish between the maximal and non-maximal interpretations in the representation (cf. 8b and 8c). 2 Even more importantly for us, as can be seen from (8), the theory does not provide an explanation of how and when the various interpretations arise, since it does not include an account of pragmatic factors (whether the structure of a situation or the intent of a conversational agent).
Schwarzschild 1991 and Brisson 1998
Schwarzschild (1991) proposes an account of distributivity, focusing on spelling out the role of packaging by building a free variable over covers (Cov i ) into the denotation of VPs, which allows them to distribute up to sub-pluralities of the definite plural given by the cover. A cover is defined in (9a); the specific cover in (9b) derives the intermediate-distributive interpretations (6c, 9c) from the representation in (9d). (9) a. Cover: a set of sets of entities, such that the union of the sets in the cover is the universe of discourse. b. {{arti1,arti2,Br.sprout1,Br.sprout2},{caulif,daikon,endive},{John…}} c. The vegetables are too heavy for the big scale and too light for the small scale
Brisson (1998) builds on Schwarzschild (1991) to permit exceptions by allowing mismatch between the distribution of individuals into the cover-cells and the NP denotations (ill-fitting covers (defined in 10a)).
Unlike Landman (1989) , she only derives cases of a few salient exceptional items (10c, from representation in 10d), rather than existential interpretations like (6b, 7b-2).
(10) a. A cover is ill-fitting with respect to an NP denotation if some members of NP denotation are in the same cover-cell as non-members, so no union of cells in the cover equals the NP denotation. b. {{windw1},{windw2},{windw3},{windw4},{windw5,Mary, door}} c. The windows are open (but we didn't get to the bathroom window yet)
There are serious drawbacks in the cover-based account. First, the final interpretation depends on the distribution of individuals into cover-cells, making non-maximality essentially a matter of narrowing the domain to a relevant set. In this, the cover-based account of Brisson 1998 inherits the problem of any theory that derives non-maximality through domain narrowing.
In fact, as examples (6b, 7b) repeated below (11) demonstrate, nonmaximality is not a matter of domain selection of any kind: there is no "relevant set" of open windows, and no window is more relevant than any other -it is simply irrelevant which or how many windows are open, as long as some of them are. This problem is intrinsic in the cover-based approach, and derives incorrect interpretations for many non-maximal uses of definite plurals. Second, the distribution of individuals into cover-cells is denoted by a free, deictic variable, whose denotation is fixed when a particular cover is made salient in preceding discourse or extra-linguistic context. This deictic nature of Cov i requires at least the speaker to know the exact composition of cover-cells, including the special cell containing exceptions, in the same way this is required for a pronoun. This is strikingly contrary to fact: the speaker doesn't need to know the identity of the vegetables for the intermediate distributivity interpretation to arise in (6c, 9c), nor does he need to know the identity of the exceptional windows for the non-maximal interpretation to obtain in (4, 6b, 7b) .
One way to avoid making demands on speaker knowledge is to intensionalize the Cov i variable, varying the distribution of individuals into cells with each possible world compatible with what the speaker knows. As Kratzer (2003) notes, "amending Schwarzschild's account of plural predication, we would want to say that plural predication depends on contextually provided cover functions, not just on contextually provided covers."
In terms of the needs outlined in the previous section, the cover account derives (at least some of) the influence of the VP (since the Cov i variable is part of the VP) and of the "packaging" aspect of scenarios (whenever context provides a salient cover that yields correct interpretation), but does not have a mechanism for integrating the influence of speaker/hearer goals into the analysis.
Landman 1996 and his recasting of Schwarzschild 1991
In his wide-reaching article "Plurality", Landman (1996) provides a recasting of Schwarzschild's 1991 proposal in his own framework (what he dubs 'Theory IV' of plurality). This is done by allowing cover roles, defined as in (12a), and illustrated in the proof (12d) for the denotation (12c) for the sentence (12b), in a situation where Andy, Bill, Chris, and Dan are the boys (compare with 6c, 9c). The cover roles are a very powerful mechanism: using them, we can derive the interpretations in (5ab, 6abc) in a similar way (13). e is atomic, *Ag(e)=!(d1"d2"d3"d4"d5), so "({#(d)}) = ="({d1"…"d5})= d1"d2"d3"d4"d5=#(! "x *door(x,w)) q.e.d. = !w.#e *OPEN(e,w) & *Ag(e)= "x door*(x,w) e=f"g…"j, Ag(f)=d1,…Ag(j)=d5, so *Ag(e)=(d1"d2"d3"d4"d5) so "({#(d) })="({(d1,…,d5)})=d1"…"d5=#(! "x *door(x,w)) q.e.d.
Landman's reinterpretation preserves the flexibility of Schwarzschild's theory, allowing for the intermediate-distributive interpretations like (6c, 9c, 12d). Representation no longer contains the free, deictic variable Cov i .
On this approach, the speaker only has to know that there is a cover making the statement true (i.e., the speaker must only be sure of the existence of a proof like the one in (12b), where knowledge that the teams are boy-made will point to the existence of such a proof).
The resulting analysis allows the full range of empirically attested interpretations, and says nothing about the way these various interpretations are derived and the factors that influence the derivation.
Sentences like (14) just mean that subparts of the given group of windows/boys, in some packaging, are agents for (potentially plural) states of being open / events of raft-building. This is much less information than would actually be transmitted by such an utterance in the situation (15). Similarly, this account incorrectly predicts that in a situation from (6a), repeated below in (16), the speaker can truthfully utter 'The vegetables are not too light for the big scale' on the collective interpretation, even when the baskets are actually too light for the scale. After all, the possibility of putting all the baskets on the scale at once points to the existence of some way to make the sentence true. Thus, by getting rid of the deictic cover variable, we have lost crucial information in this case.
While clearly too weak to stand on its own, this semantics is the perfect starting point for an account drawing on pragmatic factors to derive a stronger interpretation -after all, in a particular scenario (6, 7), hearers are perfectly clear on whether all or some windows/doors are required to be open, and on which packaging is meant when baskets of vegetables need to be weighed.
Interim conclusions
In a theory of definite plurals, we must take into account that in accounting for the influence of packaging on interpretation, deixis to packaging is necessary in some cases (e.g., 6a,16) -without it, the semantics is too weak (15, 16) . At the same time, deixis to packaging is wrong in some cases (6b, 11) -because it makes nonmaximality a matter of domain selection, and so the interpretations derived using it are contrary to fact.
We still need to incorporate speaker/hearer goals into the analysis. In the proposal I lay out in the next section, I will introduce a deictic variable that will always include reference to hearer's goals, and will encode information about packaging only when such information is relevant to hearer's goals.
Decision Theory approach
The proposal
I apply Merin's (1999) and van Rooy's (1999) Decision Theory (DT) based definition of relevance to definite plurals, replacing the cover analysis, integrating Landman's (1996) recasting of Schwarzschild's proposal with a principled account of how and when the various interpretations arise.
The chief innovation is thus the unification of the vague/flexible semantics with a formal analysis of pragmatic factors influencing the truth-conditions of sentences with definite plurals.
Agents in conversation are constantly modeling each other's goals. As a part of cooperative communication, each speaker aims to change the hearers' states of knowledge so as to help them progress towards their goals. This is the heart of the Cooperative Principle (Grice 1975) , and in particular, of the Relation (Relevance) maxim.
When interpreting a vague utterance (in this case, one containing a definite plural), hearers select propositions which can influence their actions in achieving the goal. Agents' goals (and more) can be represented as decision problems (DeP) they are solving. A DeP is a triple <P,U,A>, where the probability function P represents agent's beliefs, utility function U reflects the agent's preferences, and a set of (mutually exclusive) actions A the agent chooses from.
A proposition q changes agent's beliefs (P), resolving the DeP if, after q is learned, a single action has, in each resulting world, the highest utility. In making an utterance, the speaker aims to resolve hearers' DeP 3 .
A relevance ordering between propositions (17) yields the contextual criterion for licensing and choosing an interpretation for plural definites, just as it does for questions, with relevance defined as helpfulness in resolving the DeP.
(17) Proposition p is more relevant (better to learn) for resolving DeP than q (p > DeP q) iff i. p eliminates more actions as non-optimal than q does or ii. p eliminates the same number of actions as q does, and q entails p (i.e. q is over-informative)
This relevance ordering, built into the definition of the variable REL (18) REL is a function that takes the decision problem, VP and NP denotations, and a world, and outputs a set of individuals g, which could be groups or sums. The framed conjunct assures that when you boil g down to singularities, all of those singular individuals are atoms in the NP denotation (e.g., 'the boys'). The second conjunct assures that no other such NP-made (e.g., boymade) thing h is more relevant than g -i.e., there is no h such that, as the underlined portion states, it's better to learn that "h VPs" than that "g VPs."
REL replaces Schwarzschild's (1991) Cov i in encoding the vagueness and context-dependence. REL operator comes as part of the VP, following syntactic assumptions in Schwarzschild (1991) and preceding literature on distributivity (196c). The operator containing REL introduces a set of alternatives -O Rel is a function from VP and NP denotations to the set of optimally relevant propositions (196a). The sentential existential quantifier converts the set into a single proposition at the top. This last operation is the one introduced for the Hamblin semantics in Kratzer and Shimoyama (2002) (see also Keshet (this volume) ). The schema for the entire sentence is given in (19). w1"w2"w3 is closed !(w1"w2"w3) is closed !(w1"w2)closed !(w2"w3)closed !(w1"w3)closed !(w1"w2)"w3 is closed ... !(w1"w2)"!(w1"w3) is closed… w1"w2 closed w2"w3 closed w1"w3 is closed w1 is closed w2 is closed w3 is closed A built-in consequence of the framework is this: the only way to force a maximal interpretation is for REL to produce a single most-relevant proposition, so that the existential quantification over propositions is over a singleton set. Further, we inherit from Landman the fact that maximal interpretations are simply fully distributive ones, where a unique optimal proposition involves distributive predication over a sum.
To illustrate what happens when these conditions fail to hold, consider the example in (21) w1"w2"w3 is closed !(w1"w2"w3) is closed w1"w2 closed w2"w3 closed w1"w3 closed !(w1"w2)closed !(w2"w3)closed !(w1"w3)closed w1 is closed w2 is closed w3 is closed !(w1"w2)"w3 is closed … (w1"w2)"!(w1"w3) is closed… d. Some possible interpretations:
i. #p [p!{#e.*clo(e)&w1+w2+w3+w4+w5=*Ag(e)} & p=1] (all of the windows are closed) " ii. #p[p!{#e*clo(e)&w1=*Ag(e),#e*clo(e)&w2=*Ag(e),...}&p=1]
(some of the windows are closed)
Consider an agent facing a different problem (21a Thus, whenever REL fails to winnow the set down to a single fullydistributive proposition, the existential quantification over propositions will result in a weaker meaning, stating that one of the most-helpful propositions is true. In the case when the hearer doesn't care which windows are closed, all propositions stating that one of the windows is closed are equally most-helpful. Thus, the existential quantification over propositions creates the effect of existential quantification over the windows, i.e., the non-maximal reading.
Deriving distributivity
The worked example below illustrates that the hearer chooses the level of distributivity based on (17) in a (by now) familiar fashion. Suppose that exact composition of the teams is not known (but it is known that there are two boy-made teams in the competition). Interpretation [i] The remaining propositions in the set represent the set of speaker's epistemic possibilities, i.e., the speaker's uncertainty about the composition of the teams. 8 In this framework, speaker's uncertainty about the exact distribution of individuals into "packages" will prevent REL from eliminating the propositions that involve the correct level of distributivity. The existential quantification over propositions will then capture the speaker's inability to choose among the remaining propositions. 9 The framework also opens up a possibility of having non-maximal intermediate-level interpretations, impossible to derive in Landman 1989 or Theory IV (Landman's 1996 recasting of Schwarzschild 1991 . Empirically, such readings do arise sometimes. For instance, in an international soccer competition, where men's and women's teams from various countries compete, an observer can say "The African men won" to mean that some of the men's teams from Africa won (say, Ghana and Tunisia), even if some lost (say, Togo).
